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HINES V. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT:

ANOTHER STEP IN THE SEEMINGLY
INEXORABLE MARCH TOWARD CONVERTING
FEDERAL JUDGES (AND JURIES) INTO
LABOR ARBITRATORS OF LAST RESORT
by Peter Adomeit*
1.

INTRODUCTION

This article, directed to the courts, and especially to the federal
bench, carries this message: you are in danger of converting the fed
eral judiciary into a panel of labor arbitrators.
The advance sheets of the federal courts are beginning to read
like Labor Arbitration Reports. The kinds of disputes that in the past
were resolved by private arbitration are beginning to appear at an
increasing rate on the dockets of the federal courts: Did the company
have just cause when it discharged the grievants for allegedly falsify
ing their expense accounts?1 Did the company violate the agreement
with the union when it assigned the grievants to night work?2 Was
the employer justified in discharging the grievant for allegedly strik
ing her superior?3 Did the grievant place the meat on the loading
dock, intending it to be picked up by accomplices, and did that con
stitute grounds for discharge?4 Was the company justified in discharg
ing the grievant for possessing a bandsaw stolen from the company?S
Was the grievant, who signed a confession admitting his theft, dis
charged for cause?6 Should the company have given credit to the
* B.A., Carleton College; J.D. University of Minnesota; Associate Professor of Law.
University of Connecticut School of Law:
1. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.• 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
2. Barrett v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 538 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1976).
3. Wilson v. Washington Post Co., [1976) 93 L.R.R.M. 2300 (D.D.C. Jul)· 21. 1976).
4. Sarnelli v. Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 33, 333 F. Supp. 228 (D. Mass. 1971).
aird 457 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1972).
5. Lewis v. Magna Am. Corp., 472 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1972).
6. Whitmore v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, (Div. of Greyhound Lines. Inc.). 383 F.
Supp. 46 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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grievant for seniority earned while working in South America?7 Was
the grievant, a truck driver who admittedly sought pay for time not
worked, guilty of theft of company time, and thus properly dis
charged?8 Was the grievant discharged for cause after he struck a
bridge with his truck?9 Was the grievant's alleged intoxication suffi
cient cause for his discharge?lO Did past practice justify paying the
grievant a lower rate of pay for piloting a smaller boat?l1 Is al
coholism an illness, entitling the grievant to sick leave under the
contract?12 \Vas the grievant, who had only one good eye, properly
laid off when his job was changed to require him to drive?13 Was the
grievant's job classification proper?14 Did the company assign the cor
rect seniority date to the grievant?15 Was the grievant's explanation of
why he allowed an unauthorized female passenger on a charter bus
believable, or was he discharged for cause?16 Should the grievant,
who while off duty and away from the factory assaulted his foreman,
be reinstated with back pay, or was discharge an appropriate penalty?17
These cases, taken from the reports of the federal courts, involve
issues no different from those in the hundreds of reported cases in
the CCH Labor Arbitration Awards or in the BNA Labor Arbitration
Reports, not to mention the thousands of arbitration decisions that go
unreported. If the courts would prefer to handle more of these
cases-and there are more where these came from, namely from the
daily frictions of the working place-all they need do is give a broad
reading to Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight. 18
7. Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n., 468 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1972).
8. Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Servs., Inc., 537 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1976) (rt,·
versing a jury verdict for plaintiff of $20,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 In
punitive damages).
9. Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1975).
10. Zaleski V. Glendale Foods, Inc., and Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 26, [1975]
91 L.R.R.M. 2377 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 18, 1975).
11. Dishman V. Crain Bros., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
12. Hilliard v. Armco Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aIrel without
opinion, 532 F.2d 746 (3rd Cir. 1976).
13. Siskey v. Teamsters Local 261, 419 F. Supp. 48 (\V.D. Pa. 1976).
14. GroInick v. United Furniture Workers, Local 75A·75B, [1976J 91 L.R.R.M. 2558
(D. Md. Feb. 5, 1976).
15. Butler v. Local 823, In!,I Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975).
16. Miller v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., [1977J 95 L.R.R.M. 2871 (E.D. Pa. May 25,
1977).
17. Griffin V. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972). (This case resulted in II jury verdict
for the grievant of SI2,000.)
18. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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Hines 19

involved the nine year saga of eight truck drivers who
were caught up in an alleged scheme to defraud their employer, An
chor Motor Freight. Anchor accused the drivers of falsif)'ing their
motel expense accounts and began dismissal proceedings. When the
union took the case to the final grievance hearing, the only evidence
it presented to the arbitrators was the drivers' protests of innocence.
The company had the drivers' expense sheets and motel receipts, and
affidavits from the motel clerk and the motel owner, both swearing
that the receipts were accurate. The case was tried before a joint
arbitration committee of six: three from the trucking industry and
three from labor. The committee members were not persuaded by
the drivers' claims of innocence. They upheld the discharges, the
labor members voting with management. Although this proceeding
was not before a neutral arbitrator,20 by agreement the decision was
final and binding and therefore enforceable. 21
Having lost their case before the joint committee, the drivers
retained an attorney. The attorney interviewed the motel owner ,md
secured a written admission that he presumed the receipts were accu
rate, but had no direct personal knowledge of that fact. Armed with
this new development, the attorney petitioned the joint arbitmtion
committee to reopen the case. The committee, responding that the
decision was not based on the affidavit of the owner, refused, where
upon the eight drivers sued the company and the union for one mil
lion dollars. Their claim against the company was the same as their
case before the industry panel: they had falsified nothing and there
fore the company had violated the agreement in the labor contract
19. The facts of the case as set forth in the complaint ,Uld affidavits ~ubmittl'd on tlll'
motion for summary judgment appear in the opinions of tll(.' district court. the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. See Hines v. Local 377, lnt'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, [1973] 72 Lab. Cas. ,: 13,987 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 1973); Hine' \". Lot'aI377,
Int'I Bhd, of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 19741; Hines v. Anchor ~totor Frt'lght,
Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
20. Robert Coulson, president of the AmeriC<1Jl Arbitmtion ru~oCI.l.tion, .ugUl'~ th.lt
the decision of the joint committee was more like a settlement of a ~l,\·.IIlC"l' th.1Il .111
arbitration decision. He rightly perceives that Hines undl'rmines tll(.' doctrinl' of finality
of arbitration decisions, if the decision of the joint panel is trl'ated ,u. a dl'l'l~ion of .1.11
arbitrator. See Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes' Illegitimate Child: Thl' 11II11act of ..\ndlOr .\tutor
Freight on the Finality Doctrine in Griet'ance Arbitratioll, 10 CA. L. REv. 693, 697-99
(1976). Cf Jacobs, Fair Representation and Binding ,\rbilratioll, 28 L-\u. L.J. 369 j 1977,.
21. See Ceneral Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 89 v. Rbs & Co., 372 l'S.
517 (1963) (decision of trucking industry joint arbitration committee Iwld l'nforce<lbll.').
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not to discharge except for cause. Their claim against the union was
this: by failing to investigate the clerk, by telling the drivers not to
worry, by failing to give the hearing panel any paper evidence to
counter the company's paper, and by acting out of animosity, the
union had violated its duty of fair representation. 22
During the pretrial stages, the drivers' attorney deposed the
clerk, and the case took on a new twist. According to the clerk, what
at first appeared to be a ploy by the drivers to cheat Anchor Motor
Freight turned out to be something quite different. The most damn
ing evidence against the drivers-the motel receipts-had shown
quite clearly that they paid less for their lodgings than they claimed
on their expense accounts. In the deposition taken three years after the
discharge hearing, the motel clerk, who had sworn in the affidavit
presented at the hearing that the receipts were accurate, decided to
recant his story. He claimed in the deposition that the receipts were
not accurate. In effect, he admitted that he was stealing from the
motel.
The three courts that reviewed Hines all indicated that the com
pany acted in good faith, without knowing that the clerk would
recant. The union appears to have known nothing more about the
matter than the company. Only the drivers and the clerk know for
certain what really happened. The drivers' sworn denials were not
believed by the company or the joint arbitration committee. The
clerk made two conflicting statements under oath, but as of yet, no
trier of fact has considered his testimony in the light of his recanta
tion. Historically, the courts have reacted to recantations with .sus
picion. 23 The decision of the United States Supreme Court, however,
did not reflect that suspicion.24 But even if the recantation were
true,25 the drivers would still need to prove that the union had vio
lated its duty of fair representation.
The drivers' allegations that the union acted out of spite and ill
will and thus violated the duty of fair representation were crucial to

22. The plaintiffs rested their case upon Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 111 (1967).
23. See United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1954). See also 58 AM. JUII. 2d
New Trial § 175 (1971).
24. "There were later indications that the motel clerk was in fact the culprit." 424
U.S. at 558.
25. The July 1977 issue of Study Time, distributed by the American Arbitration As
sociation to labor arbitrators, describes a discharge case involving a hospital orderly. He
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the success of their attempt to have the case reopened. The courts
have set aside arbitration decisions only on the narrowest of
grounds,26 and this case does not fit any of them. The arbitrators did
not exceed their powers; they did not refuse to hear relevant tes
timony; they did not fail to grant a reasonable request for a con
tinuance; their decision was not obtained by fraud or corruption; and
their decision did not require the company to perform an illegal act.
Courts have stated, in dicta, that an award based on evidence J.."Jlown
by a prevailing party to have been false at the time it was used may
be set aside. 27 However, this principle would not govern the Hines
case since there was no showing that Anchor Motor Freight manufac
tured, or knowingly relied on, false evidence. 28 The compan)' acted
in good faith.
The drivers could have tried to have the arbitration reopened on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, namely, the clerk's deposi
was accused by a nurse of "amusing himself by pushing an elderly patient in a wheel·
chair at high speed." At the arbitration hearing, she changed her story. The arbitrator
disbelieved her recantation, and credited her first story.
Occasionally, a witness who recants will recant the recantation. Till.' Hartford
Courant, Apr. 29, 1977, at 20, reported that "a 21 year-old Hartford man admitted
Thursday that he retracted his statement to police implicating a woman friend in plan
ning the robbery of a North End landlord, who was killed during the holdup. But [the
man] said he gave the retraction to [her] defense attorney in his Hartford jail cell last
December only because his family was threatened by the brother of the woman he
accused."
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Arbitration Act, N.Y. ClV. PMC. LAw § 7511 (~lcKinney 1963);
U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970). Connecticut's law is typical. Coss. CEo";.
STAT. § 52-418 (1977) sets forth the traditional grounds for vacating awards:
(a) If the award has been procured by corruption, fmud or undue means; (b) if
there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators or
either of them: (c) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refUSing
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear e\i
dence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action b)' which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced: (d) if the arbitrators have ex
ceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Nor mayan arbitration decision be set aside simply because the court disagrees with
the arbitrator's interpretation of a contract. The New York Court of Appeals has st.'lted:
"Those who have chosen arbitration as their forum should recognize that arbitration
procedures and awards often differ from what may be expected in courts of law."
Rochester School Dist. v. Teachers' Ass'n, [1977] 95 L.R.R.~1. 2119, 2121 (Apr. 1, 1971).
27. See Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer Mach. Co., 187 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum);
Newark Stereotypers Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 391 F.2d 594 (3rd
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968) (dictum).
28. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. at 569.
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tion, but that too would have been an uphill battle. Neither the stat
utes nor the court cases allow new arbitration hearings for newly dis
covered evidence,29 because to do so would destroy one of the major
advantages of arbitration: finality.30 Even if the law were otherwise
and arbitration decisions could be reopened for newly discovered
evidence, the drivers still would have had to argue that the evidence
could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence. When the
losing side tries to reopen a court judgment, the law requires no
less. 31
But if the evidence could not have been discovered with reason
able diligence, how can it be alleged that the union violated its duty
of fair representation by failing to discover the evidence in advance of
trial? The two theories conflict. As it turned out, the Hines decision
states that arbitration decisions cannot be reopened for newly discov
ered evidence. 32
The drivers could have tried to have the case reopened on the
ground that the arbitration panel relied upon hearsay evidence,
namely, the motel receipts and the affidavits of the clerk and owner.
This too probably would have failed. The receipts of the motel were
prepared in the ordinary course of business and would have been
admissible in court under the business records exception to the hear
say rule. 33 The affidavits would not have been admissible in court,

29. "Petitioners are not entitled to relitigate their discharge merely because they
offer newly discovered evidence that the charges against them were false and that In
fact they were fired without cause." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. at
571.
30. See Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Clr.
1971). "To give appellant a rematch before the arbitrator, merely because a witness who
refused to enter the original contest has now decided to participate ... would undercut
the finality and therefore the entire usefulness of arbitration as an expeditious and gen
erally fair method of settling disputes." 442 F.2d at 1238.
31. See, e.g., Orso v. City and County of Honolulu, 56 Haw. 241, 534 P.2d 489
(1975); see also 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 60.23[4], at 273 (2d ed. 1975).
One seeking a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence must
show not only that the evidence upon which he relies as the basis of his claim
was in fact newly discovered or unknown to him until after the trial had bcen
had, but also that he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced such evidence at the trial-that his failure to produce the alleged
newly discovered evidence at the original trial was not due to laches, negli
gence, or want of diligence on his part.
58 AM. JUR. 2d New Trial § 168 (1971).
32. 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1970); FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (which states a qualification
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but arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence and may rely
upon technically inadmissible hearsay.34 One of arbitration's advan
tages is that it does not follow every technical rule of evidence.
Therefore, although hearsay was presented, its use provides no
ground for overturning an arbitration award. 35
The drivers could have attacked the rule of law allowing deci
sions of joint labor-industry panels to stand as arbitration awards. But
that would have meant attempting to have a decision of the United
States Supreme Court overruled. 36
Thus, the drivers picked the only argument that stood a chance
of succeeding: that the union violated its duty of fair representation.
This theory was not without its difficulties. The Supreme Court had
never held that a union violated the duty of fair representation in the
way it presented a grievance in arbitration. The nearest case, \Taca v.
Sipes,37 involved a union that refused to arbitrate. Compromising be
tween giving the union absolute power to refuse arbitration and giv
ing the worker absolute power to force arbitration, Vaca v. Sipes
allowed the worker to sue the company for breach of contract if the
on the admissibility of records in cases where "the source of information or other cir
cumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.").
34. See, e.g., Petroleum Separating Co. v. lntemmerican Ref. Corp., 296 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1961) ("[T]he arbitrators appear to have accepted hearsay evidence from both par
ties, as they were entitled to do. If parties wish to rely on such technical objections they
should not include arbitration clauses in their contracts. The appeal is quite insubstan
tial.") (footnote omitted); Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. Y. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 241
(1946) ("[A]rbitrators are not bound by strict adherence to legal procedure and to the
rules on the admission of evidence expected in judicial trials. Such a requirement
would tend to defeat the object of the arbitration proceeding.") (citations omitted); Bur
chell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 96 (1853); American Almond Prods. Co. Y. Consoli
dated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand) ("Arbitration mar or
may not be a desirable substitute for trials in courts; as to that the parties must decide
in each instance. But when they have adopted it. the}' must be content with its infor
malities; they may not hedge it about with those procedural limitations which it is pre
cisely its purpose to avoid. They must content themselves with looser approximations to
the enforcement of their rights than those that the law accords them, when the}' resort
to its machinery.").
35. Under rule 29 of the American Arbitration Association Labor Arbitration Rules,
the arbitrator may rely upon affidavits but is not required to do so. Some arbitrators are
reluctant to decide cases based on hearsay alone. But the matter is left to the discretion
of the arbitrator. See F. ELKOURl & E. ELKOURl. How ARBITRATIOS WORKS 280.81
(3d ed. 1973).
36. General Drivers, Warehousemen, & Helpers Local 89 \'. Riss & Co., 372 U.S.
517 (1963). For a criticism of these committees, see R. JAMES & E. JAMES, HOFFA .\.'1:0
THE TEAMSTERS 171-85 (1965).
37. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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union refused to arbitrate out of spite or ill will, or arbitrarily, or in
bad faith. Some lower courts had extended Vaca to include cases in
which unions arbitrated and lost, on the theory that if the union un
dermined the integrity of the arbitration process by deliberately los
ing the case by not putting up much of a fight, the individual ought
to have another chance to win. 38 But in none of these cases did the
main witness against the grievants recant his testimony one year after
the hearing.
Because the duty of fair representation could mean that a union
has a duty to investigate a grievance,39 and because the union in
Hines did not interview the clerk or the motel owner, it arguably
failed to investigate the case adequately. Had the only allegation
been failure to investigate, the drivers would probably have lost.
Failure to investigate may constitute malpractice. There are a few re
ported cases against unions alleging straight malpractice in the han
dling of grievances. Some cases have been successful in which the
union has let slip a deadline. 4o Others have not been successful be
cause the courts have found no ill will or bad faith.41 Imposing mal
38. The clearest expression of this doctrine came down after the Hines lawsuit was
filed. In Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1974), the court stated:
To us, it makes little difference whether the union subverts the arbitration pro
cess by refusing to proceed as in Vaca or follows the arbitration trnil to the end,
but in so doing subverts the arbitration process by failing to represent the em
ployee. In neither case, does the employee receive fair representation.
Margetta and other cases are cited in Hines, 424 U.S. at 571-72 n.ll.
39. Before Hines, several Courts of Appeals had so stated. See Turner v. Air Trunsp.
Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972) ("It is beyond doubt that the duty
of fair representation includes an obligation to investigate and to ascertain the merit of
employee grievances."). Turner found this duty in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191,
wherein it was stated: "[W]e accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion ...." See also De
Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packing, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir. 1970) ("There
was no evidence as to any plaintiff except [one] that the union ever investigated or
made any judgment concerning the merits of her grievance.") (footnote omitted); Minnis
v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Minnis presented testimony which, if be
lieved, showed an utter failure by the unions to make even a minimal attempt to inves
tigate or process his grievance.").
40. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Handwerk v.
Steelworkers, 67 Mich. App. 747,242 N.W.2d 514 (1976); Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co.,
411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
41. In Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967) the grievant argued that the
Union erred in submitting to an arbitrator in 1962 the question of the grievant's health
as of 1958. The court found no evidence of bad faith and ordered the complaint dis
missed. Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970) stated at 872 that
"proof that the union may have acted negligently or exercised poor judgment is not
enough to support a claim of unfair representation." The district court stated that the
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practice liability upon a union for the manner in which it handles
grievances involves momentous questions of public policy. Might not
such a policy require an unrealistic level of expertise? Should union
stewards and business agents be held to the same standards as attor
neys? Should the remedy for poor representation be political, that is,
the election of better union leaders? Might not the cost of malprac
tice liability, or malpractice insurance (if it could be found), bankrupt
weak or small unions? Is it fair to impose liability on the employer
because it won a case in which the union erred? Should the decision
to impose malpractice liability be made by Congress, after public
hearings, rather than by the courts?
However, because it was alleged in Hines that the union failed to
investigate out of spite or ill will, the case appeared to fit the theory
that a union has a duty to represent its members fairly.42 One of the
drivers had been fired before and this fact was alleged to be sufficient
to indicate that the union had ill will towards him. In addition, some
of the drivers had, in a direct challenge to the union leadership, led a
wildcat strike. If a union contract contains a no-strike clause, a failure
by the leadership to try to end a wildcat strike makes the union liable
for strike-caused damages. 43 Thus the strike was alleged to proVide
further evidence of ill will. The third piece of evidence presented on
the issue of bad faith involved an earlier union merger. Some of the
charges against the Union included failure to "adequatel), and full), prepare a paper
defense for the plaintiff at the railroad hearing" and failure to become "fully acquainted
with all the relevant facts of the plaintiff's case." 305 F. Supp. 443, 444 (E.O. Pa. 1969).
For a discussiQn favoring malpractice liability, see Note, 34 WASH. & LEE L.R. 309 (1977).
42. When Hines reached the court of appeals, the court stated that, in order to sur
vive a motion for summary judgment in a breach of duty action, the plaintiff must allege
perfunctory treatment by the union (here, that the union failed adequate!)' to investigate
the grievance), and that the union acted in bad faith. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 506 F.2d at 1155 (1974). "The failure to investigate, by itself, is insufficient
to fix liability on the union since 'proof that the union may have acted negligentl)' or
exercised poor judgment is not enough to support a claim of unfair representation:"
506 F.2d at 1156 (citation omitted). The court of appeals, quoting Balowski \'. UAW, 372
F.2d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 1967) indicated that a "gross mistake or inaction" would be an
indication of bad faith. 506 F.2d at 1157. The grant of certiorari did not include this
portion of the case. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 561 (1976).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Michigan has held that a union ma)' \'iolate
the duty of fair representation even though it has not acted in bad faith. SC(' Lowe v.
Hotel Employees Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 148, 205 N.W.2d 167, 178 (1973). Some
United States courts of appeals have agreed. See gellerally, Clark, Till.' Dllty of Fair
Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TE...... L. RE\'. 1119 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Eazor E:l.llress, Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), Cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976), in which the union's failure to control a wildcat strike
resulted in a judgment against the union in excess of one million dollars.

636

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:627

drivers were members of a local that had merged with the union. The
merger, which was not entirely smooth, resulted in some animosity
between the two groups.
The union and Anchor moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted both motions, stating that although the union might
have been careless or might have exercised bad judgment, it did not
violate the duty of fair representation. 44 The court of appeals ruled
that whether or not the union acted out of animosity was a question
of fact, and that on the facts presented, a jury could find that the
union could have discovered the clerk's lie in advance of the arbi
tration. 45 The case against the union was remanded for trial. The
court of appeals, however, agreed with the trial court that Anchor
should be dropped as a defendant, because Anchor was not shown to
have acted in bad faith. 46 Both courts indicated by their rulings that
it would be unfair to impose a million dollar judgment on the com
pany for relying upon the affidavits, the receipts, and the arbitration
award. The drivers asked for a writ of certiorari;47 the union did not
seek review. The drivers' request was granted. 48
The Supreme Court held that, assuming the union breached its
duty of fair representation by failing to investigate, and assuming the
drivers were innocent of the charges, then the company is liable for
discharging them without cause, even though the company acted in
good faith. 49 Read narrowly, Hines simply reaffirms the rule in Vac(l
that a company may be sued for breach of contract, notwithstanding
the arbitration clause, if the union has violated its duty of fair rep
resentation. The major difference between the two cases is, of course,
the existence of the arbitration award in Hines. In Vaca, the union
refused to arbitrate; in Hines, they arbitrated and lost.
Technically, the Supreme Court in Hines did not hold that a
44. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, [1973] 72 Lab. Cas. ~ 13,987 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 25, 1973).
45. 506 F.2d at 1157.
46. Id. at 1157-58.
47. 424 U.S. at 561 n.7.
48. 421 U.S. 928 (1975). The question on which certiorari was granted reads as
follows:
Whether petitioners' claim under LMRA § 301 for wrongful discharge is barred
by the decision of a joint grievance committee upholding their discharge, not
withstanding that their union breached its duty of fair representation in pro
cessing their grievance so as to deprive them and the grievance committee of
overwhelming evidence of their innocence of the alleged dishonesty for which
they were discharged.
49. 424 U.S. at 561, 570-72.
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union violates the duty of fair representation by failing to investigate
a grievance out of spite or ill will. That issue, decided by the court of
appeals against the union, was not reviewed. 50 But the majority opin
ion in Hines rests upon the presumption that the union violated its
duty of fair representation. One can only conclude that the Supreme
Court approved, tacitly, the holding of the court of appeals that a
jury could infer from the drivers' evidence a violation of the duty of
fair representation. The discussion that follows indicates why this de
cision is wrong.
III.

AN

EMERGING DOUBLE STANDARD?

While the decision below simply reversed a summary judgment,
the court of appeals would allow a jury to infer that animosity caused
the failure to investigate. Such failure appears to the author to be
equally consistent \vith good trial strategy. While the drivers alleged
that the union, out of bad faith, failed to produce paper evidence to
counter the company's paper evidence, 51 and failed to discover through
investigation that the clerk was the culprit, 52 the resulting reversal of
summary judgment imposes a standard of preparation upon unions
that is at once unreasonable and unworkable. 53
First of all, the union knew, in advance of the final hearing, that
the clerk had signed the affidavit and had sworn to the accuracy of
the receipts. 54 A further interview \vith the clerk could have been
unproductive and risky-unproductive because many witnesses, once
interviewed, identify \vith the side that spoke to them frrst;55 and
risky because the clerk could testify at the hearing that the union
50. Id. at 561, n.7. The court of appeals would require proof of ill will plus imlde
quate investigation. 506 F.2d at 1156-57.
51. Hines v. Local 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, (1973) 72 Lab. Cas. at C; 28,131.
("defendant Union presented not a single piece of paper in response to the charges
against the plaintiffs at the grievance hearings").
52. Hines v. Teamsters, 506 F.2d at 1156.
53. However, the court added that "the failure to investigate, by itself, is insufficient
to fix liability on the union...." 506 F.2d at 1156. But if the plaintiffs could coO\'ince a
jury that there was ill will between them and the union, the failure to in\'estigate would
violate the duty of fair representation.
54. The decision of the trial court reveals that the affidavits and receipts were used
against the grievants as the case was processed through the grievance procedure. (1973)
72 Lab. Cas. at ~ 28,130.
55. A. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY 172 (2d ed. 1973) ("[W)jtnesses have a ten
dency to remain loyal to the first person who interviewed them and the)' may regard the
second investigator as a person from 'the other side.' ").
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tried to pressure him into changing his story. We know from hind
sight that the clerk never testified, and, in fact, recanted his story.
But to require the union to interview the clerk, who had already
given a signed statement, prior to the hearing, is to substitute the
judgment of the court for the judgment of the union on a matter of
trial tactics and strategy.
Similarly, the union could have interviewed the clerk's em
ployer. He claimed in the affidavit used in the grievance process that
the receipts were accurate. Weighing the risk that he would change
his story against the risk that he would claim the union had pressured
him, the union could have reasonably concluded that the safer course
would be to wait until the hearing and cross-examine the witnesses at
that time.
There was no cross examination-neither the clerk nor the
owner testified. We do not know whether they were available. We do
know that later the owner admitted he did not know of his own
knowledge whether the receipts were accurate. 56 We also know that
the panel that heard the grievance said they did not rely upon the
owner's affidavit. 57
This case demonstrates the problems of using affidavits in a dis
charge case. It would have been better if the company had produced
the witnesses. It might even make some sense to require live tes
timony in such cases. 58 But to reverse the arbitration because the
union failed to investigate makes little sense. Whether or not to in
terview adverse witnesses before trial is a matter of judgment. There
is no tradition of formal discovery in arbitration cases. Usually, when
a case goes to arbitration, it has been heard at the lower levels of the
grievance process, and each side is aware of the other's claims. When
a labor lawyer or a business agent defends a grievant in a discharge
arbitration, the advocate usually has a file showing the company's
case and may even have a transcript of prior testimony, or, as in
Hines, affidavits from witnesses. But in the usual case, there simply is
neither time nor money to hire investigators to do character checks of
the witnesses against the grievant. Such a requirement would be un
reasonable. A few examples illustrate this point.
In a recent case tried to the Connecticut Board of Mediation and
56. 506 F.2d at 1155.
57. Id.
58. Some arbitrators would require live testimony in a case like this. See note 35
supra.
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Arbitration,59 the company, suspecting that the grievant charged auto
parts to the company and installed them in his own car, showed an
employee of the auto parts store photographs of suspects. He iden
tified the grievant as the man who ordered the parts. The company
then checked the grievant's personal automobile and determined that
its new parts corresponded to those charged to the company. The
grievant was fired. He denied the charges. The union decided not to
arbitrate. The grievant talked to the man who identified him, and
following their conversation, the clerk changed his story and retracted
the identification. The grievant then demanded that the union arbi
trate the case. The company resisted arbitration, claiming the time
limits had expired. The grievant claimed the union had violated the
duty of fair representation, and therefore the time limits did not
apply. Under the Hines rule, to get to the jUI)' on this issue, the
grievant would have to show only that the union bore him ill will. GO
In another case, a bus company suspected that a certain ticket
clerk was shortchanging travelers, especially those who spoke poor
English. 61 After warning the clerk, the company hired a detective
agency, which employed eight Spanish-speaking Americans to pose as
travelers. Each purchased a ticket from the grievant, giving him
marked bills. Each immediately delivered the ticket and the change
to an official of the detective agency. According to their testimony.
and that of the official, seven out of the eight travelers were short
changed. The grievant protested his innocence and denied short
changing anyone. He admitted he could have made a mistake in
quoting the proper ticket price but claimed that all clerks make mis
takes from time to time. Did the union have a duty to hire an inves
tigator to check the character and background of each of the wit
nesses against the grievant? Hines would suggest that if any of them
later recant, the answer is yes. Yet the cost of such an investigation
could be hundreds of dollars, more than some unions can afford.
In a third case, a bus driver, while coming down a long moun
tain grade on a two-lane highway, turned a comer and discovered the
traffic in front of him stopped dead. 62 He applied the brakes, but
59. The source of the case is the Connecticut Board of ~lediation and Arbitration.
The names of the union and company are protected by the privacy of arbitration.
60. 506 F.2d at 1153.
61. This is an actual case in which the author participated. The names of the union
and company are protected by the privacy of arbitration.
62. This is an actual case in which the author participated. The names of the union
and company are protected by the privacy of arbitration.
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there was not enough room to stop. To avoid slamming into the bus
directly in front of him, at the last moment he swerved his vehicle to
the left, and struck a car in the oncoming lane, killing its occupant.
At the arbitration hearing concerning his discharge, the company
produced evidence in the form of a written report stating that the
brakes were tested after the accident and were in excellent working
order; that the company had a rule requiring drivers to maintain
one-quarter of a mile between two company vehicles, a rule which
the grievant violated; and that within the last year, the grievant had
received a written warning when a company official saw him driving
down the mountain road, following too closely the vehicle in front of
him. The grievant denied following too closely and claimed the
brakes failed. He produced a report of the highway patrol showing
that the company had received a ticket after the accident for having
brakes that were illegally adjusted. According to Hines, the union
would have a duty to investigate whether the company official who
tested the bus, and the one who saw the grievant following a vehicle
too closely were telling the truth, presumably by hiring an inves
tigator to do character checks.
This imposes upon a union a higher duty than the law imposes
upon a trial lawyer who prepares a case for trial. There is no question
that given enough time, and money, a trial lawyer or a union can do
character checks on witnesses. But to require them to do so would go
far beyond the way that most labor arbitrations, and most court trials,
are prepared. Indeed, in hearings before the National Labor Rela
tions Board, parties cannot discover the testimony against them until
the hearing. 63
It is important to consider the economics of trying discharge
cases. A discharge case may be worth more in attorneys' fees after it
is lost than before it is tried. Suppose in Hines the union had hired
an attorney to conduct the hearing. A busy labor attorney might
spend one-half a day in preparation, and a day in arbitration, and bill
the client five hundred dollars. Or the attorney may be on retainer
with the union, and simply try the case as part of the normal fee. It
63. There is no right to discovery in NLRB proceedings. The Interim Report nnd
Recommendations of the Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB for 1976, nt 56, revenls n
deep division of opinion on whether this should continue. The courts nre not nllowlng
discovery under the Freedom of Information Act. See Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80
(3d Cir. 1976); Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuches, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1976); ccrt.
U.S. _ ; Title Guarantee v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, _
denied, _
U.S. _ .
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is not the practice for lawyers to try such cases on contingent fees;
most unions would not agree to such a proposal.
However, if the grievants lose the arbitration, and if they then
hire their own lawyer to sue the union for violation of the duty of fair
representation, they may well have to agree to a contingency fee of
thirty percent or more. In a case like Hines, involVing eight truck
drivers, nine years of back pay, and a claim for one million dollars,
suddenly the case acquires real value. The lawyer now has an incen
tive to spend days on such a case. We therefore have a system that
encourages the first lawyer to spend perhaps a day or two to arbitrate
the case, and the second lawyer to spend many days trying to dis
cover whether the arbitration was imperfect.
It is certainly true that union and management advocates make
mistakes in arbitration. Advocates, like some trial lawyers, occasion
ally cross-examine witnesses when they should remain silent, remain
silent when they should cross-examine, fail to see an argument, or fail
to fully develop the facts. Unprepared witnesses testify in ways that
surprise everyone. Yet if a company representative makes a mistake,
and the company loses, the company cannot appeal to a court to
overturn the award. The company advocate is under no duty of fair
representation. But if the union advocate performs poorly, and the
union loses, the grievants can appeal to a court. And if they can con
vince a jury that the union leaders do not like them, because they are
troublemakers, or because they were fired before, or beC'cluse they
once led a wildcat strike, they can win in court, even though they
lost in arbitration. In other words, malpractice plus ill will equals an
overturned arbitration decision.
In fact, the union error need not amount to malpractice. If a trial
lawyer had done what the union did in Hines, there would have been
no malpractice. 64 Another example is Holodnak v. AceD Corp.,
Avco-Lycoming Div., 65 which involved a man who was fired for
64. The author could find no case in which a lawyer was held guilty of malpractice
for failure to interview a witness who had already signed a statement. The failure to
take a depOSition was claimed to be malpractice in one case, but the question was not
decided. See Talbot v. Schroeder, 13 Ariz. App. 230, 231, 475 P.2d 520 (1970). An attor
ney is expected to exercise "that degree of care, skill and diligence which is commonl>·
possessed and exercised by attorneys in practice in the jurisdiction." Annot., ,\ttOnlcy's
Liability for Negligence in Preparing or Conducting Litigation, 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 12
(1956). See also W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 161-62 (3d cd. 1964), The author's experi
ence in preparing and presenting over two hundred arbitration cases is that an ad\'erse
witness who has signed a statement is rarely interviewed again.
65. 381 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (D. Conn. 1974), which was affirml-d in part and re
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criticizing his company in a newspaper article. The discharge went to
arbitration. The union's lawyer, representing Holodnak, £'liled to
argue that the first amendment applied to Avco. That failure, among
others, was held to be a violation of the duty of fair representation. 66
Avco was a private corporation which manufactured many prod
ucts, both civilian and military. The government owned the land on
which the factory was located and some of the buildings and equip
ment. Government officials inspected the quality of the products. The
trial court67 found that the company and the government were effec
tively "one"; that Avco could not constitutionally discharge Holodnak
for writing the newspaper article; and that the union, failing to assert
the first amendment argument to the arbitrator, violated the duty of
fair representation. The court of appeals affirmed these findings. 68
Were this an action against a lawyer for malpractice, the lawyer
would have won. Numerous courts have ruled that a lawyer is not
liable for taking a position on a legal question which is uncertain. If
reasonable 'lawyers may differ over a legal proposition, failing to as
sert it, or asserting it one way and not the other, is not malpractice. 60
Reasonable lawyers could well differ over whether the first amendversed (on other grounds) in part in Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (197,s).
66. 381 F. Supp. at 200. Failure to argue the first amendment was an alternative
holding. The trial court also found that the union violated the duty of fair representation
because its lawyer, who met Holodnak for the first time shortly before the arbitration,
adopted an inferior trial strategy by arguing that Holodnak did not fully understand
what he was doing. (According to the company's appellate brief, the attorney, who was
replacing a colleague who died before the hearing, had reviewed the file and was fllmil·
iar with the case.) The lower court also indicated that the arbitrator was biased against
the grievant. 385 F. Supp. 191, 195·200. The court of appeals expressed general agree·
ment with the trial court's findings but did not specifically address the issue of union
representation. 514 F.2d at 287.
Holodnak's article criticized the union, the pennanent arbitrator (who sustained the
discharge) and the company.
67. Circuit Judge Lumbard, sitting by designation, 381 F. Supp. at 193.
68. 514 F.2d at 287.
69. "[Ilt has frequently been held that a lawyer is not liable for lack of knowledge as
to the true state of the law where a doubtful or debatable point is involved." Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 5, 15 (1956). See, e.g., Martin v. Burns, 102 Ariz. 341, 343, 429 P.2d 660, 662
(1967) (refusing to hold an attorney liable "for a mistake in a point of law that has not
been settled by the highest court of the jurisdiction and upon which reasonable lawyers
may differ."); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 587, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825; Banerian v. O'Malley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 116 Cal. Rptr. 919, 925 (1974);
Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954); Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105
(Okla. 1963).
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ment applied to Avco Corporation. 70 Before Holodnak 71 no case had
held that defense contractors were limited by the Brst amendment. 72
But the Holodnak case was brought against a union for violation of
the duty of fair representation, and a higher standard than that set for
attorneys prevailed.
Griffin v. VA W73 is another case involving a union "error" which
would not amount to malpractice. Mr. Griffin's foreman disciplined
him for a rules infraction. Later, at a hockey game, they fought, the
foreman sustaining facial lacerations and cracked ribs, Mr. Griffin sus
taining a fifty dollar fine on a charge of criminal assault. The company
70. The closest case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) in
volved racial discrimination by a restaurant, a lessee of the government. Not only was
Burton distinguishable on its facts, but the Supreme Court was not o\'eri)' interested in
expanding its holding. The Court in Burton warned that the decision rested upon the
peculiar facts of the case. "Owing to the very 'largeness' of government a multitude of
relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that. it
must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or
circumstances present." 365 U.S. at 725-26. Later, the Court refused to extend Burton to
private clubs holding state liquor licenses. Moose Lodge No. 107 \'. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972). Indeed, after the Holodnak arbitration hearing, the Supreme Court refust.-d to
apply the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to a public utility that cut off
service, even though the utility was closely regulated by go\'ernment. Jackson v. Met
ropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). The Second Circuit refused to extend the
first amendment to a university research project funded by the feder.u government.
Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974).
Still another Supreme Court decision stated that public employees who criticize their
employer may, under certain circumstances, be fired, despite the first amendment. Pick
ering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). And the NLRB and the Supreme Court
had ruled that employees who publicly attack their company's product as a bargaining
tactic are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act and may be fired. See
NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW ("Jefferson Standard"), 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Patterson
v. Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956). It is not uncommon for arbitr.ltors to sus
tain discharges of employees who criticize the company. Sec Thiokol Chem. Corp., 52
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1254 (1969); Forest City Publishing Co., 58 Lab. Arb. & Disp.
Settl. 773 (1972); Carl Fischer, Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 675 (1955).
71. 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), affd in part, rcv'd in part. 514 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
72. Avco's brief in the court of appeals states: "To suggest that Avco's military con
tracts alone constitute a significant governmental presence is to say that any priwte
corporation which sells a substantial portion of its output at a single plant to the gov
ernment is a party coming within the ambit of the First Amendment. This standard ...
would bring under the umbrella of the 'governmental action' the majority of major man
ufacturing corporations in the United States." Brief for Petitioner. Holodnak \'. Avco
Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975). Others have argued that the Supreme Court should
extend the Bill of Rights to control corporations. Sec A. S. MILLER. THE ~tOOER."
CORPORATE STATE, 182-87 (1976). However. this step remains to be taken b)' the
United States Supreme Court.
73. 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972).
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fired Mr. Griffin, no doubt to protect the foreman from further as
saults and to deter others from attacking their foremen. Mr. Griffin's
union prepared a grievance and filed it at the first level. The union,
faced with the choice of filing the grievance with the man who fired
the grievant or with the man who fought him, chose the latter. When
the case finally went to arbitration, the discharge was sustained. Mr.
Griffin then sued the union for violation of the duty of fair represen
tation and won a $12,000 verdict. The court of appeals affirmed. 74
The court nullified the arbitration decision, not because of what the
union did at the arbitration hearing but because the court thought
the Original grievance should have been filed with the man who fired
Griffin-not because the contract required it, but for psychological
reasons. The court speculated that although the foreman could not be
expected to overturn the discharge, perhaps the foreman's superior
might, especially because the foreman was unpopular. 75
Had this been a case against a lawyer for malpractice, for filing
the grievance with the foreman, the lawyer would have won. The
courts do not second-guess a lawyer's choice of strategy and tactics.
Choices of forum, remedies, arguments, and witnesses are within the
attorney's discretion. 76 If the attorney makes an honest judgment,
74. Id. at 182-84. The court drew a distinction between negligence and handling a
grievance in a perfunctory manner. Only the latter is a violation of the duty of fair
representation. How the two concepts differ, the court never explained. See 469 F.2d at
183.
75. 469 F.2d at 184-85. The court also said that had the matter been appealed to the
manager sooner, the manager might have reversed the discharge. With all due respect,
we believe the court engaged in pure speculation which ignores the industrial facts of
life: companies do not like to see their foremen assaulted and tend to discharge those
who engage in the practice. The numerous assault cases are cited in F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 656 (3d ed. 1973).
76. See Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tenn. App. 1976) (choice of tactics
will rarely, if ever, support a malpractice claim); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 III. App.
2d 235, 252, 194 N.E.2d 489, 498 (1963) (failure to call corroboration witness is not
malpractice); Lynn v. Lynn, 4 Wash. App. 171, 175,480 P.2d 789, 792 (1971) (a differ
ence of opinion over trial tactics is not malpractice); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106,
112-13 (Iowa 1975) (election to sue under one dram shop act and not the other is not
malpractice; neither is the decision to ask for $35,000 damages and no more. In the
course of the opinion, the court reviewed the authorities and concluded: "It is the gen
erally accepted rule that mere errors of judgment by a lawyer are not grounds for neg
ligence, at least where the lawyer acts in good faith and exercises a reasonable degree
of care, skill and diligence." 225 N.W.2d at 112.). A review of the California decisions
concludes: "In view of the complexity of the law and circumstances which call for dif
ficult choices among possible courses of action, the attorney cannot be held legally re
sponsible for an honest and reasonable mistake of law or an unfortunate selection of
remedy or other procedural step." 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 150, at 161
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and loses the case, the courts will not call the decision malpractice. If
every choice of strategy were later reviewed in a second lawsuit for
malpractice, the trial of cases would become impossible. 77
These cases illustrate the developing double standard. one for
unions representing members in discharge cases before arbitrators.
another for lawyers representing clients in court. The lawyer is held
to the lower standard. 78 The reason for this difference in treatment is
not readily apparent. It may be grounded in a judicial distrust of
unions in discharge cases. For example, the employer in Hines v.
AncTwr Motor Freight79 knew no more about the facts than the
union. Both sides had the same evidence. The court of appeals80 and
the Supreme Courts 1 stated that the company acted in good faith; yet
both courts were willing to allow a jury to conclude that the union
did not. In fact, the court of appeals in Hines indicated that the issue
of fair representation would be allowed to go to a jury even if the
proof of bad faith were "minimal."82 For that proposition the court
relied upon St. Clair v. Local 515,83 a discharge case. There, the
union contract had no arbitration clause. The union protested Mr. St.
Clair's discharge, but unsuccessfully. It failed to strike over the dis
charge, or to threaten to strike, or to file a second protest. 84 Those
facts were enough to create a jury question of whether the union
violated the duty of fair representation. Other cases have dispensed
(2d ed. 1970). See also Banerian v. O'Malley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 116 Cal. Rptr.
919,925 (1974).
77. The English rule is even stronger than the general rule in this country: a trial
attorney may not be sued for the manner in which a case is tried. The immunity is
absolute. There are no exceptions. See Randel v. W., [1966] 1 All E.R. 467, 480, and the
same case on appeal, [1966] 3 All E.R. 657, 667 (C.A.), Randel v. Worsle)', [1967] 3 All
E.R. 993 (H.L.).
78. See notes 76 and 77 supra.
79. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
80. 506 F.2d at 1157.
81. 424 U.S. at 569.
82. 506 F.2d at 1157.
83. 422 F.2d 128, 131 (6th Cir. 1969) ("In considering the issue of good faith rep
resentation, the jury must of course consider the union's duty to represent all of its
members. It might conclude that the union was acting in good faith in refusing to strike
and thereby jeopardizing many members' livelihoods over a grie\'ance which either it or
the employer in good faith considered frivolous. Although we think that the e\'idence of
bad faith is minimal, there is enough to present a jury question.").
84. The court of appeals stated that the inaction of the union president, to whom the
grievant was referred after the union's assistant business agent lodged the initial protest
with the company, might have supported a charge of bad faith since there was a union
election in progress in which the grievant was vocally opposing the incumbents, includ
ing the president. 422 F.2d at 131.
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entirely with the notion that plaintiff must prove the union acted in
bad faith. 85 One commentator has written that the duty of fair rep
resentation is violated by proof of union "carelessness" plus "animos
ity" and that the courts should not require proof of "negligence. "86
Should the courts pursue their present course, and give Hines an
expansive interpretation, they will find themselves labor arbitrators of
last resort. Some of the same personality traits that can lead to dis
charge may not endear the grievant to labor any more than man
agement. 87 Couple such a grievant with an accusation that the union
failed to investigate the discharge adequately, and you have created a
technique to retry arbitration cases in court.
The courts have never come to grips with labor's power to in
voke arbitration. The present compromise-give the union the power
to arbitrate unless the union refuses, out of spite or ill will88-has led
85. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975); sec also
Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974);
Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971). "An allegation
that plaintiff's attempt to remedy his grievance was thwarted by lack of response and
interest on the part of union officials was a sufficient allegation that the union acted
arbitrarily and with bad faith." Lowe v. Hotel Employees Local 705, 389 Mich. 123,
146, 205 N.W.2d 167, 178 (1973), stating the holding of Pompey, supra. Perhaps the
strongest statement found in any case minimizing or dispensing with the bad faith re
quirement is found in Lowe:
Every man's employment is of utmost importance to him. It occupies his time,
his talents, and his thoughts. It controls his economic destiny. It is the means
by which he feeds his family and provides for his security. It bears upon his
personal well-being, ... and physical health.
It is no solace to a man fired from his job that his union acted without spite,
animosity, ill will, and hostility toward him. If he has been wrongfully dis
charged by his employer, in violation of his contract of employment, a collec
tive bargaining agreement made for his benefit and protection, it is unthinkable
that he should be denied relief-denied justice-by the courts.
389 Mich. 123, 148, 205 N.W.2d 167, 178-79. Other courts, including the court of ap
peals in Hines, 506 F.2d at 1156-57, have required proof of bad faith. See, e.g., DlII v.
Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971)
("proof that the union may have acted negligently or exercised poor judgment is not
enough to support a claim of unfair representation," quoting from Bazarte v. United
Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970». See also Lewis v. Magna Am. Corp.,
472 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1972).
86. Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEXAS L.
REV. 1119, 1171 (1973).
87. There is no requirement that unions have to like a grievant before they defend
the person, any more than criminal lawyers need to like the accused. I have seen union
representatives fight vigorously to save the jobs of miscreants not because they liked the
people, but because it was their job.
88. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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to a new doctrine: if the union arbitrates poorly, and loses, the case
will be retried if the grievant can show some evidence of animosity.
This doctrine means that arbitration is less binding than court
litigation. Consider the outcome if the discharge hearing in the Hines
case had been tried in court. Assume the jury believed the drivers
were lying, and sustained the discharge. And assume that one year
later, the clerk recanted. The drivers could not have won a retrial on
the theory that they were not represented adequately. If a lawyer
makes an error, the remedy is a malpractice suit against the lawyer,
but not a new trial against the original defendant.89 Arbitration,
intended to be more binding than litigation, ends up being less
binding.
If a witness in a criminal trial recants, the defendant is not enti
tled automatically to a new trial. Recantations are looked upon with
suspicion.90 The federal rule requires the judge who presided over
the trial to hold a hearing to hear the recantation before deciding
whether to grant a new trial. 91 The trial judge is in a better position
to determine whether justice requires a new trial. 92 Hines did not ex
plore the possibility of an initial hearing to determine the truth of the
recantation, yet the outcome will turn on whether the clerk's affidavit
was true or false. The Court did not mention the usual cautions about
recantations; nor did it remand the case to the arbitrators for them to
hear the recantation. Instead, it appeared willing to allow a jury to
speculate over whether the union could have discovered that the clerk
would recant his testimony, and to speculate over whether, by failing
so to discover, the union violated its duty of fair representation.
89. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Dismissing an action for
failure to prosecute, the Court stated: "Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney ... ,
and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely
selected agent." 370 U.S. at 633-34.
"In civil cases the rule is practically universal that a new trial will not be granted on
the ground of the negligence or incompetence of the attorney for the party applying for
such new trial." 58 AM. JUR. 2d New Trial § 160 (1971). But see In re Cremidas' Estate,
14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alaska 1953) (attorney's intoxication during trial grounds for retrial).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954).
The fact that a witness for the prosecution has recanted does not automat·
ically entitle the defendant to a new trial. The courts are suspicious of such a
change in the testimony of a witness, and tlle)' are entitled to weigh the
changed testimony carefully to determine which version of tlle story told by the
witness is the one that should be believed.
58 AM. JUR. 2d New Trial § 175 at 391.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir. 1976).
92. Id. at 866; United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111·12 (1946).
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The price of perfect justice93 is high, and if the courts want to
redetermine the guilt of persons discharged for alleged wrongdoing
and found to be in the wrong by arbitrators, then discharge arbitra
tion will no longer be final and binding.
IV.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER FROM ARBITRATORS TO COURTS

The fair representation doctrine transfers the power to interpret
and apply labor contracts from the arbitrator, the person most desired
by labor and management, to a judge and jury. As a result, both
labor and management lose control over what their contract means,
and lose the kind of predictability that comes with experienced labor
arbitrators. For example, in Barrett v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,94 the
company refused to assign two stock room clerks to the day shift. The
clerks complained to the union. The union told them that the con
tract, as interpreted and applied for twenty-two years, allowed the
company to assign them to the night shift. The two workers disagreed
with the union's interpretation of the contract. The union refused to
spend the money to arbitrate their case. They sued, claiming the
company had violated the contract, won a jury verdict of over three
thousand dollars, but lost in the court of appeals by one vote. 95 An
experienced labor arbitrator would have taken ten minutes in decid
ing this case for the company: both union and company agreed to the
interpretation of the contract and the past practice was long standing,
well-known, accepted, and clear. In such cases, the past practice will
invariably prevail. 96
This is not the only case in which the trial court submitted to the
jury the question of the meaning of a labor contract, despite the exis
tence of an arbitration clause in the agreement. 97 The majority rule is
that questions of contract construction are for the judge. 98 Whether it
93. The phrase is from the title of the 1974 book by Judge Macklin Fleming, The
Price of Perfect justice.
94. 538 F.2d 1311 (8th Gir. 1976).
95. Id. The dissenting judge would have allowed the jury to decide what the con
tract meant, but because the jury rendered two inconsistent verdicts, he would have
remanded for a new trial. 538 F.2d at 1315.
96. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 406 (3d ed. 1973).
97. Some courts have upheld the practice. See, e.g., Butler v. Local 823, Int'I Bhd. of
Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 452 (8th Gir. 1975) (the question of the meaning of the terms
of the contract had not been submitted to the jury because the court had found its terms
to be unambiguous). See also Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276, 280
(6th Gir. 1974) and cases cited therein.
98. See Barrett v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 538 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Gir. 1976) and cases
cited therein.
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is judge or jury, the procedure clearly violates federal labor policy. If
the parties have bargained for an arbitrator's construction of the con
tract, they are entitled to it. This has been recognized in at least one
action, which was brought against a railway union. If the union vio
lates the duty of fair representation, the remedy is not a court trial
over the meaning of the contract; the remedy is an arbitration before
the National Railroad Adjustment Board. 99 It has exclusive jurisdic
tion of the interpretation and application of railway contracts. lOO The
Sixth Circuit has recognized the force of this argument. It was willing
to permit a trial court to refer the underlying claim of breach of con
tract to arbitration, assuming that the member could first prove in
court that the union violated the duty of fair representation. lOl But
this case is clearly the exception.
National labor policy favors the submission of grievances to arbi
trators, not courts. 102 Nevertheless, the practice of allowing judges
99. See Goglowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 423 F. Supp. 901, 903lW.D. Pa. 1976).
Cf. Kesinger v. Universal Airlines, Inc., 474 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (6th Cir. 1973) (as
against a district court, the Civil Aeronautics Board has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
grievances arising out of labor-management negotiations on seniority lists after airline
mergers): but see Schum v. Southern Buffalo Ry. Co., 496 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974); bllt cf
Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853, 858 (doctrine of pri
mary jurisdiction [of ICC] should not be invoked in a genuine fair representation ac
tion). Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970) emphasized the difference between actions
for breach of the duty of fair representation and claims for breach of contract. It held
that a suit against the union for breach of duty is not subject to the ordinary rule that
administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts. 397 U.S. at 28.
100. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) held that claims of
breach of contract fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjust
ment Board. The case did not involve the duty of fair representation. A 1969 case,
Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969), indicated that at least in
cases of alleged racial discrimination, the plaintiffs need not exhaust their remedies
before the Board before seeking relief in the courts.
101. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312-15 (6th Cir. 1975). Scc also
Hotel Employees v. Michelson's Food Serv., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1976). The trial
court in Ruzicka at first ordered all issues to arbitration, including the issue of fair
representation, but then changed its mind. See 523 F.2d at 313-14.
102. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960) ("When
the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of in
terpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a func
tion which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitration tribuna!.").
United Steelworkers buried the earlier decision in lAM \'. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271
App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947), affd, 297 N.Y. 519,74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). Under
the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, a company, after agreeing to arbitrate all grie\'ances, could
avoid arbitration if it could convince a judge that the grie\'ance lacked merit. The Su
preme Court rightly saw that this doctrine allowed the compan>' to substitutl' the I.:ourt's
judgment for the arbitrator's. 363 U.S. at 568. See generally Feller,.-\ General T/leory of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L.R. 663, 813-17 U973).
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and juries to interpret labor contracts has been resurrected by the
doctrine of fair representation. Indeed, the Second Circuit has al
lowed individual union members to avoid arbitration by merely alleg
ing a conspiracy between labor and management. loa Not only have
the courts interpreted labor contracts under the fair representation
doctrine, they have actually nullified agreements by depriving employ
ers of the benefit of perfectly valid contract clauses requiring that a
discharge be grieved or arbitrated within a certain time period or be
lost forever. When the union fails to file the grievance or ask for
arbitration within the contractual time period, the employee may sue
the union for inadequate representation and the employer for wrong
ful discharge. In some jurisdictions, the employee has prevailed. lo4
Thus, the time limits bargained for by the principals are nullified.
V.

SUMMARY

1. The duty of fair representation now applies to the manner in
which unions prepare and present arbitration cases.
2. There is no corresponding duty for company advocates.
3. In effect, the courts appear to be in the process of creating a
doctrine of union malpractice.
4. It is possible that malpractice by itself will constitute a vio
lation of the duty of fair representation. Proof of bad faith, or ill will,
may become unnecessary.
5. The union "carelessness" standard is unrealistically high. Ar
bitration cannot function under a rule requiring the union to inves
tigate all adverse witnesses. Indeed, the emerging rule requires a
higher standard for nonlawyer advocates in arbitration than for lawyer
advocates in civil trials. It is unfair to hold the union advocate, who
103. See Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 865, 870 (2d Cir. 1967);
Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 338 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir. 1964). The Ninth Circuit
disagrees. Hotel Employees v. Michelson's Food Serv., 545 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir.
1976).
104. See Handwerk v. Steelworkers, 67 Mich. App. 747, 242 N.W.2d 514 (1976);
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Ruggirello v. Ford
Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Jackson v. Regional Transit Serv., 54
App. Div. 2d 305, 388 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1976). The Fourth Circuit reached a somewhat
different result in a railroad case, indicating that if the time limits for appeal expiro
because of the failure of the union to press the appeal, the employee's claim against the
employer is extinguished, but the union should be held responsible to the employee for
the value of the right lost. Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 562 (4th Cir.
1975) (dicta). Professor Feller would waive the time limits. See Feller, note 102 suprll
at 826.
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may not be an attorney, to the same standard as a trial attorney. It is
worse to hold that same lay advocate to a higher standard. Yet, that is
what occurred in Hines.
6. The rule only allows one side to appeal to the courts. If a
company loses an arbitration, it cannot retry the case in court, even if
its advocate did a poor job.
7. The rule means that arbitration decisions are less final and
binding than court trials; if a plaintiff loses a court trial because of
inadequate counsel, the remedy is not a second lawsuit against the
defendant.
8. The rule transfers the power to interpret the labor contract
from arbitrators selected by the parties to the crowded dockets of
state and federal courts.
9. The rule allows an individual to escape the arbitration clause
of an agreement.
10. The rule gives the grievant the psychological advantage of
coming before the jury as the victim of alleged union malpractice,
rather than a person who was allegedly discharged for cause. lOS
11. The rule exposes companies to liabilities against which
there is no protection. The company cannot buy insurance against the
union's losing an arbitration decision.
12. The present rule, by requiring ill will, favors the trouble
maker. A grievant who never did anything to offend the union leader
ship cannot use it.
The Hines decision, by permitting a jury to infer, from evidence
of animosity, that the union's alleged carelessness was deliberate.
could well convert the courts into labor arbitrators of last resort.
Whether any particular arbitration is final and binding will herein
after turn on the particular facts of the case and the predilection of the
jury. lOS And in time, the proof of animosity may become a fiction. That
is because the moral judgment that a union ought not to make a de
liberate error out of spite, when converted into a rule of law. leads to
unequal results. Two discharges, two errors, two arbitrations. and two
lawsuits to overturn them, will produce two different results. if one
union member can prove animosity and the other cannot. 107 By alIow
105. Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972) (worker who assaulted foreman
awarded twelve thousand dollar verdict).
106. For a similar observation of Vaca v. Sipes, SCI.' Lewis, Fair Rcprt'st'lltatioll ill
Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967 SUP. CT. RE\'. 81.
107. See generally Feller, supra note 102.
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ing a jury to infer that animosity caused the error, the law, in time,
may come to regard that inference as a nctionand will drop the animos
ity requirement. lOS That development, which is already occurring,10!)
could seriously impair arbitration. llo Even without that development,
Hines creates serious practical problems, best illustrated by an an
ology to litigation. Applied to lawyers, Hines would mean this: if a law
yer makes an error, not amounting to malpractice, and if the law
yer had shown some animosity towards the client, the jury would be
allowed to infer that the animosity caused the error. The lawyer would
be liable for an error of judgment, rather than for malpractice. Such
a result, unworkable in the rough and tumble of litigation, is equally
unrealistic in the rough and tumble of labor relations. 111
108. See generally Blumrosen, Individual Rights Under Collective Contracts, 15
LAB. L.J. 598 (1964). But see notes 53 & 29 supra.
109. See note 85 supra. For a view favoring this development, see Clark, supra noto 86.
1l0. See Feller, supra note 102 at 812. For an opposing view favoring tho individual,
see Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1096, 1119 (1974).
lli. In time, unions, to protect against liability, may require unpopular grievants to
hire their own counsel, so that if errors are made, the union will not be responsible.
Discharge is said to be the industrial equivalent of capital punishment. The loss of a job
and income can be devastating. If the law fears giving unions the power to say "no" to
an individual who has been fired and who wants to arbitrate, or if the law wants higher
standards of advocacy, then perhaps the law ought to allow that individual to invoke ar
bitration, at his or her expense. This is not because the individual ought to have that
power over all grievances, but because "death is different." (The phrase "death is dif
ferent" is from Arguments before the Supreme Court, 44 U.S.L.W. at 3554, 3558 (Apr. 6,
1976). This alternative would be far less costly than the Hines solution of years of litiga
tion, and a potential recovery in seven figures. Employees of railroads or airlines have
this right, see Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25,28 n.l (1970), but those workers who come
under the National Labor Relations Act do not. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
See generally Feller, supra note 102; Marchione, A Case of Individual Rights Uncler
Collective Agreements, 27 LAB. L. J. 738 (1976); Rabin & Koretz, Arbitration (wel/ncll
vidual Rights, THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA (1976); Simpson &
Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual Employee, 51 TEX.
L. REV. 1179, 1227 (1973); Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights In the Col
lective Agreement, 72 YALE L.J. 421-55 (1963); Tobias, A Plea For the Wrongfully Dis
charged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 55, 59·61 (1972).

